Trevor Jones and Stuart Lister This paper develops fu the i i ologi al u de sta di gs of lo alis i police governance and o t i ute to oade theo eti al dis ussio s a out go e a e i o te po a y poli i g, ia a critical analysis of major recent law and policy reforms in England & Wales. Recent legislation has brought important changes to the balance of constitutional-legal powers and institutional architecture of police governance. However, we argue that for several reasons, it is problematic to interpret these developments in straightforward terms of greater 'localisation'. First, in so far as there has been a decentralisation of control, this represents a growth of 'regional' rather than 'local' auspices of power. Second, there is widespread evidence of continuing i te e tio is y the centre, asserting strong influences on local policing via a range of national bodies. Third, important developments in the wider context of police policy-making -most importantly the conditions of austerity -have circumscribed the capacity of Commissioners to set their own policy agendas and esulted i a et a h e t of poli i g p o isio at the ost lo alised geographical units of neighbhourhoods. Indeed, the combination of decentralising formal responsibilty for policing policy and restrictive central financial controls amounts in practice to a devolution of blame by the centre for falling sevice standards. Finally, we argue that the growing complexity and fragmentation of police gove a e a ot e aptu ed ade uately y e ti al a alysis of e t al-local relations.
In recent years, debates about the democratic accountability of the police in England & Wales have been revitalised by the introduction of directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners he eafte Co issio e s ). Established in 2012 to replace local Police Authorities as the p i a y lo al politi al autho ity to hi h poli e fo es a e held a ou ta le, these new constitutional office-holders represent the most significant structural reform to the institutional architecture of police governance in England & Wales for over fifty years (Jones et al. 2012; Reiner, 2013; Lister 2013) . Importantly, a discourse of localism imbued their introduction, promising to gi e po e to the people i hat lo al poli e fo es do, ho they are run and how they are held to account (Reiner, 2016) . Reformers thus claimed that
Commissioners represent a significant advance in the democratic governance of the police, but also a major reversal in the long-term trend of centralisation of policing in England & Wales (see Herbert, 2011) .
Since the election of the first tranche of Commissioners, several scholars have considered whether, in fact, their introduction does represent a genuinely democratic reform of police governance (Loader, 2013; Turner, 2014; Reiner, 2013 Reiner, , 2016 Lister and Rowe, 2015) . This paper, by contrast, explores whether their introduction, and the wider accompanying reforms, have resulted in a transfer of power from national to local political institutions. In so doing, it interrogates the statutory arrangements of the revised police governance framework, but also how power is exercised within it. Whilst the reforms render important changes in the balance of formal constitutional-legal powers within the new framework, and there is some evidence of this isi le i Co issio e s growing policy-making innovation and assertiveness, we argue the changes should not be interpreted in straightfoward terms of greater 'localisation'. First, in so far as Commissioners represent an attempt to devolve powers away from central government, they should be seen as 'regional' rather than 'local' auspices of power. Second, there is widespread evidence of continuing interventionism by the e t e primarily via a range of national bodies within the policing landscape. Third, wider developments in police policy-making have constrained the de facto powers of Commissioners to set their own policy agendas, notably the financial conditions of austerity. Indeed, we argue that the combined impact of political decentralisation, financial austerity and restrictions on local tax revenue is resulting i hat a ou ts to the de olutio of la e by central government to regional and local auspices of power.
More broadly, we argue that whilst central influences continue to shape police policies at the local level, these are not exerted primarily via central government edict. Rather, they are manifested via a panoply of indirect -but highly effective -stee i g e ha is s involving a range of national bodies that sit outside of what might be termed the o e e e uti e (Edwards, 2016) of the national state. Accordingly, we posit that notions of ho go e s police policy agendas should move beyond a linear ze o-su analysis of the balance of formal powers along the central-local axis. Whilst centrifugal forces remain predominant, these play out within an increasingly fragmented and complex network of competing centres of governing power over policing policy, with a di e se a ge of poli y a to s e e gi g at different levels in the policing policy network. These are now better understood within more ua ed f a e o ks su h as otio s of ulti-e t ed go e a e Ed a ds 2016; Edwards et al., 2017; Devroe et al., 2017) , rather than one-di e sio al otio s of e t alisatio o lo alisatio i hi h politi al po e s a e o stituted y o agai st the o e e e uti e . In sum, the paper seeks to develop further i i ologi al u de sta di gs of lo alis i poli e go e a e a d o t i ute to oade theo eti al dis ussio s a out go e a e i contemporary policing, via a critical analysis of major recent law and policy reforms in England & Wales.
The paper is organised into the following sections. The first contextualises current police governance developments in England & Wales, situating them within the longer history of central-local relations. In so doing, it identifies key dimensions of the widely acknowledged centralisation of policy influence over recent decades, before drawing on broader scholarship
o go e a e to help make sense of contemporary changes within the policing landscape.
The second details the de jure reconfiguration of the formal legal framework of police governance brought about by the reforms, then considers evidence of growing de facto policymaking assertiveness by Commissioners since 2012. The third identifies how e t al influences continue to provide a strong steer within the wider networks of police policymaking and limit the degree to which the reforms can be understood as straightforward lo alisatio . The final section provides some concluding observations about the growing complexity of police governance in England & Wales.
Centralisation, governance and policing in England & Wales
T aditio al a alyses of poli e go e a e ha e deployed the term in a rather straightforward way to refer to the constitutional and institutional framework for the development and monitoring of police organisational policy (see e.g. Lustgarten, 1986) . Most police governance scholarship up until the early 2000s fo used al ost e lusi ely o the e ti al a is of influence (central-local) over public policing institutions, with some discussion of the challenges of developing democratic mechanisms for governing policing arrangements at the supranational level (Walker, 2008) . Contra the general thrust of wider arguments about governance of crime control (see below), the dominant theme of academic discussions of police governance in England & Wales has been the long-term process of centralisation by which national state institutions exerted an ever-tighter grip over policing policy to the detriment of local democratic accountability (see e.g. Marshall, 1978; Lustgarten, 1986; Savage, 2007; Reiner, 2010) . Most commentators concurred that this process has long historical roots, but that it accelerated during the decades following the 1964
Police Act, reaching its zenith during the first decade of the new Millennium (Jones, 2008) .
The most important dimension of centralisation was the power of the Home Office during the yea s p io to the efo s. U de the t ipa tite st u tu e of poli e go e a e established by the 1964 Police Act, the Home Office already had significant formal legal powers that circumscribed those of the other parties in the governance framework Reiner 1991) . Nonetheless, from the 1980s onwards it purposefully increased its influence over policing, issuing more frequent and directive policy circulars, tightening controls over senior police appointments and higher police training, and applying increasingly forensic frameworks of centralised performance management (Savage, 2007) . O e the pe iod, lo al poli i g became more heavily micro-a aged f o the e t e , its fo us a d a ti ity d i e substantially by targets and directives set by the Home Office. By the middle of the 2000s, it had overseen the introduction of a Natio al Poli i g Pla , supported by national objectives, priorities and targets for police, and the Police Standards Unit to monitor the performance of local forces and intervene in those seen as faili g . Most significantly, the Home Office controlled the greater proportion of police funding, which, when added to the contributions of local authorities and other central governments grants to police budgets, meant that most funding of provincial forces came from national government.
Another significant aspe t of e t alisatio was the influence of other national institutional bodies in the policing policy network from the 1980s onwards. Whilst these bodies were not part of the o e e e uti e of the state, as many were either completely or partly independent of central government departments, they e e highly i flue tial i shapi g a atio al poli i g agenda. In particular, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the representative body for Chief Constables increasingly operated as a national policy-making body encouraging standard approaches across forces, and what was then called Her Majesty s I spe to ate of Constabulary (he eafte the I spe to ate ), which adopted an increasingly directive approach to performance inspections during the last two decades of the 20 th century. Legally mandated by the Police Act 1996 to report on the efficiency and effectiveness of the police, the
Inspectorate operated akin to a poli e egulato (Savage, 2007) , albeit without direct powers of intervention and control. Other agencies tasked with promoting alue fo o ey i the public sector exerted further sig ifi a t atio al i flue e, particularly the Audit Commission (subsequently abolished in 2015) and the National Audit Office, the former gaining a key role in setting police performance indicators . New policing institutions designed to counter cross-border crime and security threats also emerged during the latter part of the 20 th Century, such as the regional crime squads and the Serious and Organised Crime Agency, a precursor to the National Crime Agency, established in 2013.
Viewed in aggregate, the centralising effects of these developments led Reiner (2010) Whilst o e all e t al i flue es e e lea ly i the as e da y, the police policy-making network was always a complex amalgam of different groups, coalescing on some issues but competing on others (see Ryan et al. 2001) . In addition to the various national institutions outlined above, the picture was complicated further by a range of other bodies involved in policy formulation, including but not restricted to other police staff associations, local government associations, Members of Parliament and national campaigning bodies (see . Local Police Authorities too had a role, albeit they became increasingly depoliticised and primarily administrative in function (Jones and Newburn, 1997; McLaughlin, 2005) as power accrued towards the centre and across the broader policing policy network.
Thus, a k o ledge e t of the e ti al g o th of e t al i flue es o e poli i g should e qualified by recognition that during the period the policing policy network in England & Wales was already becoming increasingly diversified along the 'horizontal di e sio . Following from the above discussions of the shifting balances of power over police policy fo ulatio si e the i t odu tio of Co issio e s, Ed a ds otio of ulti e t ed go e a e and its associated strategic conception of power has much to offer analyses of changes in the police policy-making regime. This is not to argue that the so e eig state has been stripped of its powers to shape policing, as powers dissipate throughout a shifting mass
of go e i g e t es at diffe e t le els i the syste . O the o t a y, the role of the policein western industrial societies at least -remains fundamental to how the central state seeks to govern security (Crawford, 2006) . It is widely acknowledged, however, that state powers are exercised alongside and through a more dispersed assemblage of central and local institutional formations. In this sense, a complex mesh of local, national and international influences has long acted on police policy in England & Wales, e e du i g the height of e t alisatio .
Within this, there is little doubt about the real expansion of e t al i fluences over police policy-making, which were clearly increasingly significant in the period from the late 1960s
onwards. But rather than via the operation of formal legal-constitutional powers (i.e. the o a d a d o t ol a ti ities of the so e eig state, the p edo i a e of e t al influences is accomplished by a more diffuse range of steering mechanisms and the strategic control of various resources that policy actors bring to negotiations of go e i g oalitio s within police policy-networks.
In 2012, then, the introduction of Commissioners into what was already a complex pattern of governance, i hi h e t al i flue es e e do i a t ut ofte e e ised i di e tly ia ule at a dista e , raised formidable challenges for those who wished to adjust the balance of powers in the policing policy-making framework away from the centre and towards more local auspices of power. The next section considers the meaning of localism within the
Coalitio Go e e t s police reform programme, the governance framework that emerged from it, and the early impacts of the revised arrangements.
Police governance in England & Wales: Empowering the local ?
Over the last two decades the concept of localism has gained increasing political traction within policing, as within several other public policy domains (see e.g. McLaughlin, 2005; Raine, 2013) . Much of the political appeal of lo alis can be attributed to the absence of consensus over its use and meaning (Morgan, 2007) . Clarke and Cochrane (2013:8) identify that within the public policy reforms of the Coalition Government localism was invoked to describe the decentralisation of political power to bodies or nodes presumed to be local.
Localism, they suggest, was advocated as a policy solution to the perceived problems of power being concentrated in the e t e , creating inefficiencies in the local delivery of public services, a lack of fairness in failures to create local solutions to entrenched policy problems, and a democratic deficit resulting from the disconnect between Government and citizens (see HM Treasury, 2010) . These rationalities and mentalities permeated the Coalition
Go e e t s plans for police reform. The consultation document, for example, declared that responsibility for policing would be shifted out of Whitehall a d returned to Chief
Constables, their staff a d the o u ities they se e y i itiati g a t a sfe of po e i policing -epla i g u eau ati a ou ta ility ith de o ati a ou ta ility Ho e Offi e,
2010: 2-3).
The reform programme, enacted in law by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act he eafte the A t' , established a quadripartite model of governance, drawing together Commissioners, Police and Crime Panels, the Home Office and Chief Constables into a web of interlocking institutional relations. The central pillar of the reforms was the election every four years of a Commissioner in each force area to hold the Chief Constables to account. Tasked also with maintaining an efficient and effective police force, Commissioners determine the force priorities, following consultation with their local publics, set the police precept of local taxation, which combined with central funding constitutes the force budget, and appoint the Chief Constable. As they also have the authority to remove the Chief Constable, the legislation created a vertical chain of accountability, from Chief Constable to the Commissioner, and from
Commissioner to the public via the ballot box.
The Act also established a Police a d C i e Pa el he eafte the Pa el i ea h fo e a ea to scrutinise and review the Co issio e s key decisions, including the appointment of the Chief Constable, the setting of the police precept, and the drafting of Police and Crime Pla and annual reports. Comprising local councillors and co-opted independent members, the Panel can question the Commissioner and make recommendations on the Police and Crime
Plan. Owing to how the law defined and structured their role and powers, however, Panels provide only limited checks on the authority of Commissioners (Lister, 2014 rather than along the e ti al e t al-local axis, from Chief Constable to Commissioner, it may well be that these plans are o e oste si ly lo al tha those required under the previous legislation, in that they are no longer required to include national targets. Indeed, to ensure this, one Commissioner published a lo al Poli e a d C i e Pla for each local authority area within the force area (Chambers, 2018) . Furthermore, there is evidence of Commissioners driving policy innovations, which some commentators interpret as evidence of greater responsive to public concerns and enhanced local influence (Loader and Muir, 2016; Loveday, 2018 in an array of local and regional municipal partnerships and civil society coalitions (Raine, 2016) .
It is important, therefore, to acknowledge the ways in which the reforms are effecting change.
They emerged from a consensus view across all three main political parties that the balance of influence in the police governance framework had tipped too far towards the centre . The reforms included a substantial transfer of de jure constitutional-legal powers to the lo al dimension of governance along with the major change to the institutional architecture represented by Commissioners. As discussed, there have been important examples of growing policy-making assertiveness, innovation and influence by Commissioners. That said, even if we est i t ou gaze fo the o e t to de elop e ts elo the atio state, the e e ai easo s to e autious a out i te p eti g the efo s as he aldi g a e e a of lo alised
policing.
An important issue concerning local-central relations in policing is the ea i g of lo al . Of course, this is a relative term and the sense of scale and place it depicts depends on o e s vantage point. Use of the te atio al to des i e i flue e e e ted at the le el of E gla d
We referred earlier to the p o otio of Neigh ou hood Poli i g du i g the ea ly s, ut a pe e ial diffi ulty ith su h p og a es of lo alised poli i g is that they are often constrained by the centralised nature of budgetary and policy-making powers within police force areas. Thus, the fact that key decisions about resource allocation and deployment are made at higher levels within the force restricts the scope for innovation in response to local problems. Viewed from the positions of individual local authorities or, even more so, eigh ou hoods , e ha ed poli y-making powers at the force level may be viewed as a form of relative centralisation. Further, Commissioners are to varying degrees embedded in partnerships and networks that stretch far beyond their own force areas. The development of regional collaborations between forces to share operational resources may also be perceived as increased centralisation by members of o e lo alised poli i g poli y et o ks.
Furthermore, the wider network connections of Commissioners may influence thei lo al decisions over priority setting and resource allocation, particularly their national, partypolitical affiliations (Lister and Rowe, 2015) . 
The enduring influence of the core executive
A core irony of localism is that as a political proje t it e ai s the gift of the e t e .
Moreover, and as a consequence, governments can legislate for and enact their own vision of localism, granting themselves a key role in determining what happens locally, for instance, by imposing conditions on local actors to ensure they attend to their responsibilities in ways that accord with the wishes of the e t e (Clarke and Cochrane, 2013). As discussed above, for example, the Act requires forces to respond appropriately to the threats identified by the Strategic Policing Requirement or face consequences such as the risk of reputational damage and possible resourcing implications (see HMICFRS, 2014) . From this viewpoint we can see that the f eedo s handed to Commissioners and Chief Constables to govern locally retain an element of conditionality. Hence, although the Home Office has sho a o e ha ds off role, for example, by removing national objectives and performance targets a short time after the
Coalitio Go e e t took offi e G ee ood , the o e e e uti e o ti ues to e e t st o g i flue e o lo al poli i g, pa ti ula ly th ough a a iety of te h i ues of go e i g at a dista e 'ose, . To the fore, here, the o e e e uti e , often entailing joint approaches of the Home Office and HM Treasury, has established a o i atio of a ot a d sti k type policy instruments to act as levers of policy development, reform and change within policing.
Ce t al to the a ot app oa h has ee the use of o petiti e fu di g schemes to incentivise police forces to develop activity in support of national objectives and programmes of work. Since 2013, for instance, the Home Office has run annually the Poli e I o atio . Clearly, however, driving sector-wide reforms is particularly challenging in the current fragmented institutional arrangements for policing and its governance (see Hales, 2018) . This underlines the important observation that the o e e e uti e is itself ot a ho oge ous e tity, o p isi g a a ge of e t al government departments with the capacity and motivation to influence policing. The financial context of austerity has seen the Treasury, already the most powerful of central government departments, exerting growing influence over local policing, a point developed further below.
Indeed, it appears that the Treasury, rather than the Home Office, is the primary o e e e uti e depa t e t d i i g poli i g efo s ia its stringent control of the purse strings. Secretary), attracted a raft of criticism from police for introducing a scheme nationally that required police officers to complete an extensive audit trail each time they used force against citizens (Home Office, 2015) . Both these direct interventions signalled that the o e executive retains significant potential and, from the evidence, the will, as well as the policy instruments, to exert strong influence over local policing.
An inspector calls: the influence of the national Inspectorate
Alongside the Home Office, it is evident that the national Inspectorate continues to play a strategic role in shaping police policy, thus maintaining this key axis of central state influence within policing. A a s-le gth o -governmental body, without powers to direct police forces, the Inspectorate nonetheless can make recommendations to the Home Secretary, who may intervene accordingly. During the last decade, for instance, the Inspectorate has done much to institutionalise the ul e a ility age da ithi lo al fo es, primarily by bringing it to the fore of its inspection and monitoring processes. In support, Amber Rudd announced in 2016 that …p ote ti g the ul e a le is a p io ity o e of i e as Home Secretary and as I su e you ll ag ee, it ust e the key fo us fo all poli e a d staff too 'udd, .
Subsequently, the safeguarding of vulnerable people has become a common priority of Commissioners, ith fo es e ui ed to sho o ti uous i p o e e ts i ho they seek to p ote t ul e a le g oups HMICF'", ; see also APCC and NPCC, 2017) . Although this development is tied to a broad shift in British policing towards the proactive management of p o le s ased o assess e ts of th eat, ha a d isk , the I spe to ate has purposefully steered this policy agenda (Shannon, 2018) . Linked to this agenda, and similarly supported by policy statements from the Home Secretary (see May, 2014) , over the last decade the Inspectorate has implemented a major programme of work fo used o do esti a use , which is designed to ensure that this de facto national objective is embedded within police priorities (see HMICFRS, 2017).
Given its on-going steering activity, and despite since 2012 not having to report to the Home Secretary, it is unsurprising that the Inspectorate continues to be perceived as serving atio al athe tha lo al i te ests (see HCPAC, 2015; HMICFRS, 2017) , but also that it s ole has led to tensions with Commissioners. These have emerged, in particular, over the resource implications of forces accommodating the I spe to ate s PEEL poli e effi ie y, effe ti e ess a d legiti a y i spe tio regime, which ranks forces by performance, but also from the recent impositio fo fo es to pu lish a a ual Fo e Ma age e t "tate e t detaili g management, resource and performance information, including plans to meet public demands for service. Furthermore, since the advent of its PEEL inspection regime, coupled with the readiness of Sir Tom Winsor, its civilian lead since 2012, to engage in a wide range of police debates, from national pay structures to decisions of Commissioners to dismiss Chief Constables, the national steering role of the Inspectorate has become more evident, not less so (see Winsor, 2016) . Also, its position within the police governance landscape has arguably been strengthened by the demise of the ACPO, which, coupled with the shift to civilianisation of the Inspe to ate s senior staffing, has weakened the capability of Chief Constables to challenge it (Holdaway, 2017) . Moreover, the fact that the I spe to ate s budget increased by 66 per cent between 2010 and 2015 (HCPAC, 2015: 10) whilst police force budgets shrank significantly, demonstrates the strategic importance of its enhanced role as a vital lever of e t al i flue e. This broader context of financial austerity has had further major implications for the operation of powers within the police governance framework, as discussed in the next section.
The financial context: Centralised funding and austerity
Notwithstanding the important shifts in constitutional-legal powers outlined above, Commissioners remain but one part of an assemblage of governing institutions within a highly centralised system of funding and control (Newburn, 2011) . It remains the case that for almost all forces, central government grants comprise the greater proportion of their funding (House of Commons Library, 2018), eati g a elatio ship of esou e-depe de y et ee Ce t al Government and Commissioners (see Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) . 4 In this context Raine (2014: the power balance from the centre to lo ality i i i al justi e….as long as the bulk of public funding for local services continues to come from the centre, it is evident that resource depe de y is likely to e ai pote tially p o le ati al . From this perspective, it is the central state, and specifically HM Treasury, which has extended its control over policing.
The reliance on central funding has been thrown into sharp relief by the recent austerity policies driven by the Treasury. Indeed, since 2010 the greatest single factor shaping policing in with Commissioners owing to concerns it will lead to high rates of abstraction from duty as officers attend educational courses (Lander, 2018) . Nevertheless, they demonstrate how new national policing institutions attempt to shape local policing via indirect methods of exhortation and persuasion, rather than via direct command. Although the Government s ambition is for the College to become independent of the Home Office, the Home Secretary can issue it with directives regarding the exercise of its functions and must approve both its regulatory statements and appointments of its directors. As such, the College functions as an a s le gth ody of the Ho e Offi e, ot officially pa t of the o e e e uti e of the state but still an important part of a wider regulatory assemblage operating at the national level (Holdaway, 2017) .
During the same period, there have been significant changes to the national police complaints at hdog body which have strengthened further the ha d of the e t e i di e ti g local policing policy. In 2014-15, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) received a substantial uplift in resources, increasing its capability for dealing with serious and sensitive cases of police misconduct. Pointedly, however, as with the recent increase in resources for the Inspectorate, these fu ds e e top-sli ed f o the local budgets of Commissioners.
Subsequently, owing to on-going performance concerns, in 2018 the complaints body was renamed the Independent Office of Police Conduct (IOPC). Like the College, the IOPC has placed emphasis on setting and monitoring lo al standards, but in the context of how forces handle public complaints (IOPC, 2018) . Although the legislation strengthened the police watchdog s powers to intervene and determine how complaints were handled, its Director General has emphasised the importance of the complaints body developing a forward-looking, lea i g ot la i g ultu e, hi h is fo used o sha i g lesso s with forces to improve policing practices (Lockwood, 2018) . Alongside the College, the complaints body has a key role in the atte pt of the e t e to e-p ofessio alise the poli e, hi h Holda ay a gues is pivotal to
the Ho e Offi e s o e all isio for governing the police through a loose oupled syste of national and local institutions (2017: 590).
The growing complexity of police governance in England & Wales
We noted earlier that otio s of local versus central ha e ee a do i a t the e i a alyses of police governance in England & Wales, but that even prior to the introduction of Commissioners such a binary approach was becoming increasingly problematic. This paper, however, has shown how over the last three decades the central state has configured a sizea le i stitutio al a hite tu e desig ed to stee the ole a d fu tio s of police forces (Savage, 2007; Holdaway, 2017) . National level institutions remain key aspects of this architecture, including the Home Office, the National Audit Office, the national Inspectorate, the College of Policing, the IOPC and the (re)constituted National Chief Constables Council (replacement for the now defunct ACPO). At times working in tandem with alliances of local interests, such bodies continue in varying degrees to assert important influence over the direction of lo al police policy.
These de elop e ts a e e ti ely o siste t ith the oade otio s of go e a e discussed at the beginning of this paper (Rhodes, 1997; Edwards, 2016) . Changes since 2012 demonstrate the growing complexity and institutional fragmentation of governing processes in policing. They underline the importance of a range of policy actors and variegated levers of influence, in contrast with traditional constitutional analyses of the operation of formal legal po e s a d o e state i stitutio s of poli e go e a e (Marshall, 1978) . That said, it is clear that the central state maintains significant influence, not least because of its greater financial, legal and symbolic resources when compared with other actors in the policing policy network. Despite the growing complexity of the policy process, the central state retains its capacity to define various interests as legitimate, to give shape to political organization, and to decide which policy actors to incorporate into the policy-making process.
The degree to which governing authorities at the national state level are successful in promoting their own policy agendas is, however, dependent on a range of contingent factors that facilitate and constrain the actual exercise of their influence within these policy networks.
These factors have continued to maintain and in some cases enhance the influence of the core executive s agenda and constrain that of alternative governing authorities, including 
Conclusions
Constitutional debates about police governance are significant as they raise fundamental questions about to whom the police are accountable, who controls and influences what the police do, and whose specific interests the police prioritise (Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000; Reiner, 2010) . The broad package of police governance reforms introduced by the British Government in 2012 brought significant structural change and important shifts in the balance of formal legal powers between the various parties in the police governance system. The hinge of these reforms was a directly elected single-figurehead at the force level to whom Chief Constables are accountable. Evidently, the statutory responsibilities of Commissioners give them significant political authority to shape local policing policy agendas. However, as this paper has argued, there are reasons not to over-state the extent to which (or simplify the ways in which) the reform programme has reconfigured the balance of influence from the central to the local level. operates in more subtle ways, within an increasingly complex police policy-making network characterised by bargaining, coalition-uildi g a d e ha is s of i di e t ule at a dista e .
Indeed, notwithstanding the continued importance of central influences within the system, we ould a gue that the e t al-lo al fo us of u h of the dis ussio a out poli e efo s fails to aptu e the o ple ities of hat is a i easi gly ulti-e t ed go e i g syste (Edwards, 2016) ; although, to adapt C a fo d s ) argument, the core executive remains much o e tha o e ode a o g othe s , ot least e ause of it control of the purse strings and the effectiveness of its strategies of indirect rule. The st ategi o eptio s of politi al power implied by such notions are consistent with what we consider to be a key function of localism in the UK Go e e t s police reform agenda of the last decade. A stated aim of edu i g poli e fo es elia e o e t al go e e t fu di g since 2010 was to stimulate the emergence of innovative local responses to do o e ith less (Innes, 2010). A more pessimistic interpretation, however, is that police governance reforms amount to a strategic move by a central government attempting to deflect criticism for the consequences of its radical austerity policies. On this view, in effect, we are witnessing a de olutio of la e for deficiencies in policing (see also Muir, 2018) . Whilst central government retains considerable influence of the priorities and patterns of local policing, concerns and criticisms about the decline of neighbourhood policing or perceived rises in violent crime (for example) can be deflected by Ministers to Commissioners and elected mayors. In an era of continued austerity o i ed ith i easi g de a ds upo poli i g, this aises sig ifi a t isks of espo si ility ithout po e fo Commissioners as they continue to face the challenge of achieving democratic legitimacy.
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